id: f80d951a-eddc-4171-b9d0-d616bb83efdc
name: Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant
description: |
'This rule looks for a service principal being granted the Microsoft Graph RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (application) permission before being used to add an Azure AD object or user account to an Admin directory role (i.e. Global Administrators).
This is a known attack path that is usually abused when a service principal already has the AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All permission granted. This permission Allows an app to manage permission grants for application permissions to any API.
A service principal can promote itself or other service principals to admin roles (i.e. Global Administrators). This would be considered a privilege escalation technique.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/graph/permissions-reference#role-management-permissions, https://docs.microsoft.com/graph/api/directoryrole-post-members?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
dataTypes:
- AuditLogs
queryFrequency: 2h
queryPeriod: 2h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
relevantTechniques:
- T1098.003
- T1078.004
tags:
- SimuLand
query: |
AuditLogs
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "ApplicationManagement"
| where AADOperationType =~ "Assign"
| where ActivityDisplayName =~ "Add app role assignment to service principal"
| mv-expand TargetResources
| mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties
| extend displayName_ = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName)
| where displayName_ =~ "AppRole.Value"
| extend AppRole = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
| where AppRole has "RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory"
| extend InitiatingApp = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app)).displayName)
| extend Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingApp), InitiatingApp, tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName))
| extend Target = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources.modifiedProperties[4].newValue)))
| extend TargetId = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources.modifiedProperties[3].newValue)))
| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, Initiator, Target, TargetId, Result
| join kind=innerunique (
AuditLogs
| where LoggedByService =~ "Core Directory"
| where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
| where AADOperationType in ("Assign", "AssignEligibleRole")
| where ActivityDisplayName has_any ("Add eligible member to role", "Add member to role")
| mv-expand TargetResources
| mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties
| extend displayName_ = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName)
| where displayName_ =~ "Role.DisplayName"
| extend RoleName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
| where RoleName contains "Admin"
| extend Initiator = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app)).displayName)
| extend InitiatorId = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app)).servicePrincipalId)
| extend TargetUser = tostring(TargetResources.userPrincipalName)
| extend Target = iif(isnotempty(TargetUser), TargetUser, tostring(TargetResources.displayName))
| extend TargetType = tostring(TargetResources.type)
| extend TargetId = tostring(TargetResources.id)
| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, RoleName, Initiator, InitiatorId, Target, TargetId, TargetType, Result
) on $left.TargetId == $right.InitiatorId
| extend TimeRoleMgGrant = TimeGenerated, TimeAdminPromo = TimeGenerated1, ServicePrincipal = Initiator1, ServicePrincipalId = InitiatorId,
TargetObject = Target1, TargetObjectId = TargetId1, TargetObjectType = TargetType
| where TimeRoleMgGrant < TimeAdminPromo
| project TimeRoleMgGrant, TimeAdminPromo, RoleName, ServicePrincipal, ServicePrincipalId, TargetObject, TargetObjectId, TargetObjectType
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: ServicePrincipal
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: TargetObject
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduledcloudflare/Azure-Sentinel
Publicmirrored fromhttps://github.com/cloudflare/Azure-Sentinel
Detections/AuditLogs/AdminPromoAfterRoleMgmtAppPermissionGrant.yaml
76lines · modepreview
unknown